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argues that it has served to underprotect many of the victims of
domestic violence because lawmakers have reflexively only
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benefits from marriage and, instead, use a functional approach
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INTRODUCTION
In our society, few oppose marriage.' Liberals, the religious Right,
law and order conservatives, gay rights advocates, and even fem-
inists, support some conception of state-supported marriage.2
These groups often disagree on the proper role of the state in the
regulation of marriage, but they are committed to law reform
consistent with their version of a stronger marriage institution.'
Because of the broad-based support for marriage within our society,
no successful politician can oppose the institution.4 Our legal system
generally reflects support for the institution of marriage.5 It also
1. Some queer theorists and radical feminists oppose marriage, but their views are not
reflected in mainstream politics. See, e.g., Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on
Same-Sex Marriage, 1 LAw & SEXUALITy 31, 34-35 (1991) (arguing that recognition of same-
sex marriage may produce negative results for some lesbian and gay individuals); Nancy D.
Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALl Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in
the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 353,363-72 [hereinafter Polikoff, Making Marriage
Matter Less]; Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for: Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79
VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993) [hereinafter Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for] ("I believe
that the desire to marry in the lesbian and gay community is an attempt to mimic the worst
of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that betrays
the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism."); Michael Warner,
Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEF CRITIQUE 259, 276-78 (Wendy Brown & Janet
Halley eds., 2002) (arguing that same-sex marriage will extend efforts to "normalize" gay life
and stigmatize other gay sex); Steven KI Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 505, 529-30 (1994). But see Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist
Inquiry, 1 LAw & SEXUALITY 9, 16-19 (1991) (arguing that same-sex marriage could destabilize
marriage).
2. In this Article, I am discussing marriage as recognized by the state, in contrast with
marriage as recognized by religious entities. The conception of marriage that should be
supported by religious entities is beyond the scope of this Article.
3. For further discussion of these groups' conceptions of marriage, see infra notes 15-20.
4. Hence, the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996),
passed on July 12, 1996, by an overwhelming margin in Congress and was signed into law by
President Clinton. It passed the House in a 342-67 vote, with 2 "present" and 22 not voting.
See 142 CONG. REC. H7505-06 (daily ed. July 12, 1996). It passed the Senate by a vote of 85-
14, with one member not voting. See 142 CoNG. REC. S10129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996).
5. After Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act, the Office of General Counsel of
the General Accounting Office wrote a report for Representative Henry Hyde that sought to
identify "federal laws in which benefits, rights, and privileges are contingent on marital
status." Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to
U.S. Representative Henry J. Hyde (Jan. 31, 1997), available at httpJ/www.gao.gov/
archive/1997/og97016.pdf. Remarkably, the report concluded that 1049 federal laws used
marital status as a factor in the following thirteen categories: Social Security and related
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privileges those who are in "marriage-like" relationships that are
characterized by monogamous, long-term, intimate commitments
and financial interdependence.6 This Article terms that framework
of according benefits a "marriage-mimicry" model. The legal system
defines who gets privileges and benefits by discerning who is
married or most like a married person rather than by asking who
should receive these benefits based on the purpose of such benefits.
The law of domestic violence reflects this marriage-mimicry
model.7 Legislatures first began to provide legal recourse to married
programs, housing, and food stamps; veterans' benefits; taxation; federal civilian and military
service benefits; employment benefits and related laws; immigration, naturalization, and
aliens; Indians; trade, commerce, and intellectual property; financial disclosure and conflict
of interest; crimes and family violence; loans, guarantees, and payments in agriculture;
federal natural resources and related laws; and miscellaneous laws. Id. at 2-3. For example,
the surviving spouse of a public safety officer killed in the line of duty is eligible for a death
benefit of up to $100,000. Id. at 9.
6. This Article will focus on the law of domestic violence as an example of the marriage-
mimicry approach. That approach, however, is also basic to the domestic partnership
movement. States are reluctant to accord same-sex couples the right to marry. Instead, they
are creating registration systems so that individuals can demonstrate that they meet the
traditional indicators of marriage and then acquire some of the state-provided benefits of
marriage. Employers are also using this model to provide benefits to nonmarried domestic
partners. Often, these registration programs are based on a more traditional notion of
relationships than state marriage laws, requiring, for example, proof of financial
interdependence in order for benefits to be available. As an example, The Ohio State
University requires domestic partners to attest that they "are responsible for each other's
common welfare" and "share a residence" to obtain global care services, whole health discount
program, or dependent group life insurance. See The Ohio State University Office of Human
Resources, Affidavit of Domestic Partnership, available at http-//hr.osu.edu/forms/dompaaff.
pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2006). To obtain health insurance or life insurance coverage, the
individuals must also attest that they are financially interdependent and have been in the
relationship for at least six months. See The Ohio State University Office of Human
Resources, Affidavit of Same-Sex Domestic Partnership (For Health Care and Life Insurance
Coverages), available at http'j/hr.osu.edu/forms/ben/ssdpaffidavit.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2006). Ohio State is currently reviewing these differing sets of requirements. Opposite-sex,
married couples are not required to make such statements in order to attain benefits. Hence,
the requirements for same-sex partners are more traditional than those for contemporary
marriage.
7. The marriage-mimicry model is basic to the scholarship in this area. Authors couch
discussions of the problem of domestic violence as "wife abuse" even when they are discussing
a broader topic. See, e.g., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: No LONGER BEHIND THE CURTAINS 36 (Mark
A. Siegel & Nancy R. Jacobs eds., 1983) (focusing on "wife abuse"); LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE
ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993); Linda L. Ammons,
What's God Got To Do with It? Church and State Collaboration in the Subordination of
Women and Domestic Violence, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1207, 1264 (1999) (focusing on abuse of
wives); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding
the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267,270 (1985) (describing the problem
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women who were victims of domestic violence in the 1970s and
1980s through the development of warrantless arrest statutes, the
availability of civil protection orders, and the funding of battered
women's shelters.8 In the last two decades, legislatures have
extended the law of domestic violence to cover others through a
marriage-mimicry model.9 Under this model, individuals can obtain
legal recourse from domestic violence if they are in relationships
that look like traditional, heterosexual marriages in that they are
characterized by two people who have financial interdependence,
share an intimate relationship, live in the same household, and
have a long-term commitment to the relationship.
While it is a positive development that the law has expanded the
scope of who may obtain legal recourse from domestic violence, the
marriage-mimicry model is not necessarily the correct framework,
because it was developed without lawmakers asking the fundamen-
tal questions of who is most in need of legal recourse and how the
law can best provide that recourse. A more functional approach
would permit the legal system to disentangle privileges and benefits
from marital status rather than reflexively extend privileges and
benefits under a marriage-mimicry model.'" The reflexive use of a
marriage-mimicry model under the law of domestic violence is in
of wife beating); Bernadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and
Legislative Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983, 984-97
(1989).
8. See infra Part I.
9. The law of domestic violence is generally governed by state law, and the states have
a variety of approaches. See infra Appendix B (summarizing state laws). The law of domestic
violence also protects children and the elderly; those protections are beyond the scope of this
Article.
10. It is conventional to argue that the law should promote marriage because it is good
for society for individuals to live in stable, monogamous, long-term relationships. See Anita
Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 140 (2003). This
argument is made particularly when children are in the home because children are thought
to benefit from living in a two-parent household. See id. Undoubtedly, society benefits from
loving, long-term relationships and from raising children in such households. Nonetheless,
this Article argues that society overprivileges marriage so that individuals are induced to join
or stay in the institution of marriage even when the relationship is harmful to the individuals
themselves and is not benefitting society. The law of domestic violence reflects this
overprotection. The state should seek to protect individuals from domestic violence when they
face a real threat of abuse in their homes; individuals should not have to demonstrate a
marriage-like status to receive such protection. Given the overprivileging of marriage in our
society, little risk exists that acceptance of this Article's primary thesis would result in the
underprotection of marriage and a decline in the positive benefits of marriage on our society.
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sharp contrast to the use of other categories in our legal system. We
no longer allow the state to use race, gender, national origin, or
religion as a proxy for who should receive privileges and benefits. A
more functional approach would constitute a fairer and more
efficient use of the states' financial resources.
The law of domestic violence is not unique in employing a model
that privileges marriage. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report
has documented that the federal government conditions 1049
federal benefits on an individual's marital status." The marriage-
mimicry model conditions a subset of such privileges or benefits on
an individual's marriage-like status when the individual is not
actually married. The recent recognition of same-sex marriage or
domestic partnerships at the state level has followed the marriage-
mimicry model. 2 The availability of same-sex marriage or domestic
partnerships reinforces the notion that certain individuals in our
society should receive special privileges and benefits because of
their marriage-like status, leaving other individuals with little
political recourse to attain such privileges and benefits." Some
courts have recognized that the denial of privileges and benefits to
certain individuals because of their gender or sexual orientation
violates the principle of equal protection. 4 They have readily
endorsed a marriage extension remedy without considering whether
the proper remedy is to disentangle marital status from privileges
and benefits.
11. See Letter from Brian R. Bedrick to Henry J. Hyde, supra note 5, at 2.
12. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2000) (Vermont same-sex civil unions); 2005
Conn. Acts 05-10 (Reg. Sess.) (Connecticut same-sex civil unions). In both Vermont and
Connecticut, civil unions are available only to same-sex couples and provide the same state-
provided benefits to members of civil unions as opposite-sex married couples. Opposite-sex
partners can only attain these benefits through marriage; same-sex partners can only attain
these benefits through civil unions. These developments therefore follow a marriage-mimicry
model rather than a disentanglement model.
13. Queer theorists have argued that the extension of marriage to same-sex couples
reinforces the marriage norms of society; but queer theorists are also libertarian in that they
argue against state intervention into intimate relationships. See, e.g., Polikoff, Making
Marriage Matter Less, supra note 1, at 366 ("I support the abolition of marriage as a legal
category; its religious or cultural status could continue for those who so choose.").
14. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941,948 (Mass. 2004). See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL
DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997).
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The Feminist movement, liberalism, the law and order movement,
the religious Right, and, most recently, the gay rights movement
have contributed to this marriage-mimicry model within the law of
domestic violence and marriage. The feminist movement has sought
to make marriage a better and safer place for women through state
intervention when men have committed rape or domestic violence
against women.'" Liberals have supported no-fault divorce and
simpler alimony laws that would both improve the institution of
marriage and minimize the state's role in individuals' private lives. 16
Meanwhile, the religious Right has sought to infuse state-recognized
marriage with its moral perspective through covenant marriage
17
15. See generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 375-
404 (1975); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 205-21 (1979). At the time, this was
called the "battered women's movement"; today it has been transformed into the gender-
neutral "domestic violence" movement. For an excellent historical discussion of the law of
violence against women, see generally Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). Some historians have argued that the
Feminist movement belatedly embraced the problem of violence against women but all agree
that this issue became a priority of the second wave of feminism in the 1970s and 1980s. See
LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIvES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE-BOSTON, 1880-1960, at 254-57 (1988); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE
VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 53-79 (1982);
ELIzABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 182-88 (2000). For a
discussion of the evolution of the marital rape exemption, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and
Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1382-427 (2000).
16. For an excellent discussion of the transformation of family law in the last several
decades, and its increasing emphasis on noninterference, see generally Carl E. Schneider,
Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803
(1985). While liberals did not strenuously push for domestic violence legislation during the
Carter administration, see Sewell, supra note 7, at 998-1002, they did support the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (Sept. 13, 1994),
during the Clinton administration. See generally Sarah F. Russell, Covering Women and
Violence: Media Treatment of VAWA's Civil Rights Remedy, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 327 (2003)
(summarizing press coverage of VAWA and the ensuing litigation). Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court ultimately found VAWA unconstitutional because it constituted too much regulation
of the private sector by the federal government. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
626-27 (2000). VAWA was arguably struck down under classic liberal principles of
overinterference with the private sector. For a discussion of the relationship between
liberalism and marriage, see generally Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the
Problem of Gay Marriage, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 705 (1998).
17. Under covenant marriage law, parties may not obtain a divorce without consideration
of fault. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-808 (2002); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (2000 & Supp. 2005); Chauncy E. Brummer, The Shackles of
Covenant Marriage: Who Holds the Key to Wedlock?, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 261, 271
(2003).
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and bans on same-sex marriage.' 8 The law and order movement has
sought mandatory arrests for perpetrators of domestic violence and
enhanced penalties for those who fail to pay child support in order
to improve the institution of marriage. 19 The gay rights movement
has sought to make marriage available to same-sex couples thereby
making the institution a fairer and more equitable institution. °
The result of these varied efforts has been the development of
a law of marriage and domestic violence that does not consis-
tently reflect the perspective of any of these political movements.
Feminists have succeeded in getting each state to provide legal
recourse to married women who are victims of domestic violence but
the liberalization of the law of child custody and alimony has often
placed married women in a more precarious position than before the
advent of the second wave of feminism, making it harder for them
to be able to afford to leave abusive relationships.2' Liberals have
succeeded in getting the state to intrude less into the private sphere
through invalidation of abortion and sodomy statutes as well as the
creation of no-fault divorce but they have also seen an increase in
state regulation of the private sphere through the law of marital
rape and domestic violence.22 The law and order movement has
18. See infra Appendix B (listing states with same-sex marriage bans). For an attack on
same-sex marriage, see Kenneth W. Starr, Address, "Divided America" and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2 (2005) (arguing that studies
demonstrate that children fare better in households with opposite-sex parents than with
same-sex parents). See generally Brummer, supra note 17. The story of the relationship
between religion and society is obviously a very complicated one. Linda Ammons provides
extensive documentation of how Judeo-Christian institutions in the United States have been
complicit in "promoting the subordination of women and the use of violence as a tool to enforce
submission." Ammons, supra note 7, at 1210. She extensively discusses various religious
doctrines that discourage divorce and encourage women to accept violence within marriage.
Nonetheless, she recognizes that "[slome religious institutions have begun to alter their
formal and informal doctrine so they are not perceived as endorsing domestic violence." Id.
at 1271. But she also notes that "no identifiable religious organizations on record at the
hearings [for the Violence Against Women Act] either supported or opposed this legislation."
Id. at 1267. Ammons persuasively argues that many religious organizations have
insufficiently tried to deal with the problem of violence against women.
19. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT (1984).
20. See supra note 12 (discussing Vermont and Connecticut's civil union statutes). See
generally Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence, and
Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REv. 265 (2000).
21. See Schneider, supra note 16, at 1812-14.
22. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 15, at 1486-90 (describing modern defense of the marital
1848 [Vol. 47:1841
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attained stringent warrantless arrest rules in the domestic
violence context but these rules are often underenforced due to the
continuing hesitancy of many police officers to intervene into family
relations.2" The religious Right has been able to impose its version
of marriage on society through the creation of the option of covenant
marriage and bans on same-sex marriage but it has not been able
to prevent the state from creating marriage-like models such as
domestic partnerships.' The gay rights movement has attained
more privileges and benefits for same-sex couples, including legal
recourse from domestic violence; nonetheless, states have often
relegated same-sex couples to the status of a second-class domestic
partnership with fewer privileges and benefits than marriage."
Divergent forces operating on one area of the law are nothing
new. Law is always a source of compromise. But the piecemeal
development of the law of domestic violence has created a patch-
work of protections that do not provide adequate legal safeguards to
the victims of domestic violence. The result has been a marriage-
mimicry model under which states provide individuals with legal
recourse from domestic violence if their relationship looks like a
marriage, because that model served as the common ground among
these four political perspectives. The marriage-mimicry model often
leaves individuals underprotected26 from domestic violence if they
rape exemption in privacy terms).
23. See Sewell, supra note 7, at 1006-08 (describing inadequate police response to
domestic violence calls).
24. See generally Brummer, supra note 17.
25. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201, 1204 (2002) (providing parties to a civil union
with the same rights that are granted to married couples under state law); 2005 Conn. Acts
05-10 (Reg. Sess.) (enactinga civil union provision for same-sex partners). State law, however,
cannot provide same-sex couples with the federal benefits of marriage such as immigration
status and tax benefits. As discussed supra note 5, federal law provides benefits to married
couples in more than one thousand statutory provisions. State civil union laws, unlike state
marriage laws, are also typically not valid in other states.
26. Victims of violence who cannot receive the protection of the law of domestic violence
do receive protection under the law of stalking and the law of assault and battery. But these
other areas of the law provide less stringent penalties than the law of domestic violence.
Typically, crimes that are felonies under the law of domestic violence are only misdemeanors
under the law of stalking or assault. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (West Supp.
2005) (establishing menacing by stalking as a misdemeanor of the first degree); id. § 2903.13
(providing that assault is a misdemeanor of the first degree); id. § 2919.25 (Supp. 2005)
(making domestic violence a felony of the fourth degree for a repeat offender). The law of
domestic violence also typically provides easier and enhanced mechanisms for protection
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1841
cannot establish that they are married or were married to the
alleged abuser or, in some other way, demonstrate that they had an
intimate relationship with the alleged abuser or shared the same
household. Uncritical acceptance of the marriage-mimicry model has
caused policymakers not to ask the functional question of who is in
need of domestic violence protection and how the law can best
protect those individuals.
This Article consists of three parts. Part I traces the development
of the law of domestic violence, discussing how it has developed
under the marriage-mimicry model. Part II connects the develop-
ment of the law of domestic violence to the same-sex marriage
movement. It shows how the same-sex marriage movement has
contributed to the marriage-mimicry model. Part III argues for a
marriage-disentanglement model rather than a marriage-mimicry
model in response to equal protection challenges to the law of
marriage and domestic violence. Part IV concludes this argument.
orders than these other areas of the law. See, e.g., id. § 2903.213 (Supp. 2005) (granting
protection order as a pretrial condition of release, with different rules applying when the
person is a family or household member). See generally Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives
and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 93 (2005)
(contrasting domestic violence civil protection orders from other types of protection orders).
The precise differences between the law of domestic violence and the law of stalking or assault
is beyond the scope of this Article. The law of domestic violence continues to be used by
victims of domestic violence because it provides greater remedies than would otherwise be
available for a crime by a nonhousehold member. Hence, I describe the victims of violence as
"underprotected" rather than "unprotected." The law of domestic violence is different than
other areas of the law that privilege marriage because individuals who do not attain
protection under the law of domestic violence do have recourse under other areas of the law.
Protection exists on a continuum. By contrast, individuals who do not get state-accorded
benefits such as health insurance because they do not meet a definition of marriage or
domestic partnership typically receive no benefits at all from the state. Thus, although the
law of domestic violence is an example of the privileging of marriage, the consequences of that
privileging are less stark than for other areas of the law where benefits do not exist on a
continuum.
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. I. THE LAW OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. Historical Developments
Historically, society tolerated men beating their wives," but the
situation is quite different today. Every state offers some remedy for
domestic violence within marriage and most states cover certain
individuals who face domestic abuse outside of marriage. 28 The law
of domestic violence originated in the United States by virtue of a
combination of statutory law and court decision. In 1871, "both
Alabama and Massachusetts judicially abrogated a husband's right
to physically abuse his wife."29 Maryland enacted the first statutory
law in the United States to prohibit "wife beating" in 1882. The
penalty was forty lashes or a year in jail.3 ° Broad-ranging legal
recourse for victims of domestic violence did not begin until the
1980s, in part due to efforts on behalf of the battered women's
movement of the 1970s. It took more than a decade of activism
before the federal government began to fund programs for the
victims of domestic violence and the states began to adopt protective
measures.3' One objection to these measures was that they would
violate the sanctity of the American family.32
Many obstacles had to be overcome for the law to recognize the
problem of domestic violence.33 Before the 1980s, law enforcement
officials and the courts typically refused to respond to the problem
27. Under British law of the "rule of the thumb," a man could reportedly beat his wife with
a "rod not thicker than his thumb." This rule was reflective of the historical toleration of wife
battery. See U.S. COMM*N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 2 (1982).
28. See Carla M. da Luz, A Legal and Social Comparison of Heterosexual and Same-Sex
Domestic Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and Response, 4 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 251, 274-76 (1994).
29. Sewell, supra note 7, at 992.
30. U.S. COMMN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 2. Three states-Maryland, Delaware,
and Oregon-enacted legislation authorizing whipping of abusive husbands whereas nine
states--California, Illinois, Missouri, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylania, and Virginia-considered but rejected such legislation. Sewell, supra note
7, at 993 n.77.
31. See Sewell, supra note 7, at 1000.
32. Id. at 999.
33. For an excellent overview of the problems confronting battered women, see generally
Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498
(1993).
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of domestic violence.34 In addition, few battered women's shelters
existed, with many of the existing shelters sponsored by religious
organizations that "extolled family unity and legitimated male
dominance."35 The women's movement began to open its own
shelters in the 1970s in cities such as Pittsburgh, Harrisburg,
Boston, and San Francisco.36 Legal task forces also began to
recommend state legislation "that would provide temporary
injunctive relief, protection orders, and custody and property
determinations for women who had not filed for divorce; would allow
women to sue their husbands for damages; would require police
training and statistics gathering; and would declare spouse beating
a specific crime.""v The recommended measures were a combination
of civil and criminal measures-giving women (who were under-
stood to be the typical victims) the opportunity to seek protection
orders to prevent abuse as well as giving the state the opportunity
to imprison the perpetrators of domestic violence. Liberals did not
make domestic violence a priority in the 1970s; the first two federal
efforts to provide enhanced protection for victims of domestic
violence in 1978 and 1979 were unsuccessful.38
The religious Right helped to derail the Carter administration's
efforts to provide federal funding for women's shelters to combat
domestic violence. One commentator argued at the time that
opposition to federal domestic violence legislation was fueled by the
religious Right seeking to test its political influence.39 Senator
Gordon J. Humphrey, a Republican from New Hampshire, called the
measures "intrusive and disingenuous,"4 ° arguing that the shelters
for battered women were "opposed to traditional families."4 He said
34. When one woman, for example, told the judge that her husband had previously beaten
her, the judge responded: "Well, it sounds like you must enjoy getting beaten up if it has
happened before. There's nothing I can do." SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 55.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 56-57.
37. Id. at 71.
38. Susan Schechter describes the inability of the women's movement to get federal
funding for shelters during the Carter administration. See id. at 136-50. For a discussion of
the successful attempt to enact legislation in 1984, see Developments in the Law-Legal
Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 33, at 1543.
39. See Sewell, supra note 7, at 1000 n.123.
40. Laura B. Weiss, Senate Passes Domestic Violence Bill, 46-41, 38 CONG. Q. 2718 (1980).
41. Id.
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that "an army of social workers will not insure domestic tranquility"
and that "[miorality is not susceptible to bureaucratization."42 A
lobbyist for the "Moral Majority" said that the measure would aid
"radical feminists" who will be "coming to the federal trough for a
$65 million feed."' In addition, "Southern church leaders argued
that the legislation prevented parents from spanking children and
called upon their members to urge Senate opposition."'
Nonetheless, the effort to create a criminal law response to the
problem of domestic violence was successful several years later
during the Reagan administration. The federal government
supported the shelter movement as well as enhanced criminal
penalties for the perpetrators of domestic violence. Based on a
landmark study in Minneapolis in 1984,4" the United States
Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence issued a report
that recommended that states should enact laws to require
warrantless arrests for misdemeanor offenses involving family
violence. 4' This report recommended that states "[piresume that
arrest, consistent with state law, is the appropriate response in
situations involving serious injury to the victim, use or threatened
use of a weapon, violation of a protection order, or other imminent
danger to the victim."47 The report also favored the creation of a
wide array of victim assistance programs. 48 Women's rights
organizations pushed for warrantless arrests although they were
42. Id.
43. Laura B. Weiss, "Moral Majority"Leads Lobby Blitz on Bill, 38 CONG. Q. 2719 (1980).
44. Sewell, supra note 7, at 999 n.116.
45. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment, in 2 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FROM A PRIVATE MATTER TO A FEDERAL OFFENSE 93
(Patricia G. Barnes ed., 1998).
46. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 19, at 102.
The task force that authored this report was composed of Detroit Police Chief William L.
Hart; Missouri Attorney General John Ashcroft; Dr. Ann Burgess, Van Ameringen Professor
of Nursing at the University of Pennsylvania; Marise Rene Duff, special assistant to the
Director of the National Institute of Justice; Suffolk County District Attorney Newman
Flanagan; Ursula Meese, executive director of the William Moss Institute on family life and
life in the future; Catherine Milton, assistant to the president of Stanford University; Dr.
Clyde Narramore, licensed psychologist and family and marriage counselor; Phoenix Police
Chief Ruben Ortega, and Frances Seward, former director of the Jamaica Services Program
for Older Adults and secretary of the Victims of Crime Advocacy League. See id. at 152-55.
47. Id. at 17-18; see also id. at 22-25 (providing further discussion of the arrest remedy).
48. Id. at 46-61. Absent from this list, however, is a recommendation that the federal
government fund these efforts.
2006] 1853
1854 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1841
sometimes ambivalent about mandatory language such as that in
the Attorney General's recommendation.49 They were fearful that
poor and minority men would be the disproportionate targets of
such legislation." While the support of these criminal law measures
by the feminist community varied,"' feminists uniformly supported
the funding of battered women's shelters.52 Ultimately, support
of domestic violence criminal legislation became a mainstream
"law and order" cause supported by the International Association
of Chiefs of Police and the National Football League Players'
Association.53 In addition, states began to enact domestic violence
statutes that made it easier for the victims of domestic violence to
obtain civil protection orders.54
These efforts by the Attorney General and women's rights
organizations had a dramatic effect on the law of domestic
violence. 5 By 1988, forty states had enhanced their criminal law
policies with respect to domestic violence.56 As listed in Appendix A,
seven types of measures were enacted: mandatory arrest, primary
aggressor language in mandatory arrest statute, warrantless
49. See SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at 177-78.
50. See id.
51. In Texas, for example, the feminist community strongly supported passage of the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act in 1985, which gave law enforcement personnel the ability
to make warrantless arrests in cases of domestic violence. See Susan A. MacManus & Nikki
R. Van Hightower, Limits of State Constitutional Guarantees: Lessons from Efforts To
Implement Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 269,272 (1989).
52. The challenge for feminists within the battered women's movement was that they
were often blamed for the underfunding of shelters. When battered women's shelters could
not handle the client demand, battered women often viewed the women's movement "like any
other bureaucracy" and blamed it for its ineffectiveness. See SCHECHTER, supra note 15, at
179.
53. See Sewell, supra note 7, at 999 n.117.
54. "Until the legal reforms of the late 1970's, women could not obtain a restraining order
against a violent husband unless they were willing to file for divorce at the same time."
JEFFREY FAGAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 8 (1996)
(adapting his presentation at the 1995 conference on criminal justice research and evaluation
sponsored by the National Institute of Justice). Fagan went on to note that, by 1980, forty-
seven states had passed significant reforms. Id. at 9.
55. The Attorney General's suggestions had the most initial influence on internal police
department policies. See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal
Law: Evaluating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1, 23 (1992) (finding that, by 1989, eighty-four percent of big-city police agencies had adopted
policies preferring arrest in domestic violence cases). Today, all states have statutes allowing
warrantless arrest. See infra Appendix B.
56. For a summary of state policies in 1988, see infra Appendix A.
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arrest, mandatory arrest for restraining order violation, require-
ment that spousal abuse be considered in custody determinations,
mandatory police training, and mandatory statewide data collection.
The states without enhanced enforcement policies included
Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee.57 Today, every
state has a mechanism to obtain a civil protection order and
every state provides special criminal sanctions for perpetrators
of domestic violence through warrantless arrests or enhanced
penalties for perpetrators of domestic violence.58
The domestic violence statutes enacted in the 1980s followed a
marital model of identifying which victims should be protected
through the availability of shelters, civil protection orders, or
criminal law enforcement. States provided legal recourse to married
couples; some states also provided legal recourse to unmarried
opposite-sex couples, especially if they had children or if they were
living in a spouse-like relationship. The Wisconsin statute, which
often served as the model for other states, provided legal recourse
to persons in a "marital relationship or [two] persons of the opposite
sex who share one place of abode with minor children and live
together in a relationship which is similar to a marital relationship,
except that the [two] persons are not married to each other."59
Washington's statute covered "a person who is married or who is
cohabiting with a person as husband and wife at the present time
or at some time in the past."60 Similarly, Missouri covered "spouses,
57. See infra Appendix A. MacManus and Van Hightower observe that there is no
relationship between a state's enactment of an equal rights amendment and its enactment
of enhanced domestic violence protections for battered women. See MacManus & Van
Hightower, supra note 51, at 275-76. This conclusion is not quite as surprising as they might
suggest when one considers that the feminist community was divided over the
appropriateness of criminal law sanctions in the domestic violence arena. See SCHECHTER,
supra note 15, at 177-83 (discussing challenges of working within the criminal law system to
help battered women).
58. See infra Appendix B.
59. Wis. STAT. § 46.95(c) (1979), available at http-J/www.legis.state.wi.usfstatutes/
1979/79stat0046.pdf. Today, the Wisconsin statute gives "household members" protection
under domestic violence law. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.95 (West 2003). This term is defined
as "a person currently or formerly residing in a place of abode with another person." Id. §
46.95(1)(c).
60. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020(1) (West 1980). Today, the Washington statute
defines family or household members as including "adult persons who are presently residing
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persons related by blood or marriage, and other persons of the
opposite sex jointly residing in the same dwelling unit."6 Each of
these approaches reflected a marital model, providing legal recourse
to opposite-sex couples who were eligible to marry under state law,
sometimes providing enhanced protection if they were raising
children together.
Given the context of the enactment of domestic violence
legislation-against a backdrop of being accused of violating the
sanctity of the family and marriage62mit is not surprising that most
attention was given to marriage-like relationships during this wave
of statutory enactment in the 1980s. Also, it is important to
remember that the domestic violence movement was historically a
women's movement to protect women from male domination. Little
thought was given to the problem of same-sex violence perpetrated
by men or women.63 It was considered progressive to provide legal
recourse to heterosexual women in unmarried relationships with
together or who have resided together in the past" as well as persons in a "dating
relationship." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020(1) (West 2002).
61. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 455.010(b), .020 (Vernon Supp. 1981). Today, the Missouri statute
defines "family or household member" as including "adults who are presently residing
together or have resided together in the past" as well as "an adult who is or has been in a
continuing social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim." Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 455.010(5) (West 2003).
62. Bernadette Dunn Sewell describes the efforts that prevented the passage of federal
domestic violence legislation in 1979 and 1980:
Conservative groups and politicians nationwide rallied to prevent the passage
of the proposed legislation. Led by the Moral Majority, they described the bill as
an unacceptable federal intrusion into the domestic realm, an attack on the
American family, and a means of funding feminist causes. In addition to verbal
attacks, the bill's opponents waged a telephone and mail lobbying campaign
designed to persuade senators to vote against the conference report.
Furthermore, they supported those candidates for national office with
conservative voting records, in some cases defeating more liberal incumbents.
This swung the votes of many senators previously in favor of the bill, but who
now feared opposition by the New Right, thus effectively defeating the measure.
Sewell, supra note 7, at 999-1000 (citations omitted).
63. In an important report on the problem of domestic violence authored by the United
States Civil Rights Commission in 1982, the authors describe their charge to investigate "the
battering of women by men with whom they have or have had an intimate relationship,
whether or not legally married." U.S. COMMN ON CML RIGHTS, supra note 27, at v. At the
time the report was written, the problem was called "wife battering." Today, the problem is
called "domestic violence" to describe it in more gender-neutral terms. As part of this
transition of understanding the problem in gender-neutral terms, some people have come to
understand it as including same-sex violence.
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men. But legal recourse was typically only extended to women in
marriage-like relationships characterized by a shared household,
long-term relationship, sexually intimate relations, and children."
In sum, all the states substantially expanded their laws on
domestic violence during the 1970s and 1980s. These reforms
tended to include criminal punishment and the availability of civil
protection orders.65 These reforms also tended to occur in a piece-
meal fashion, starting with a marital model and then extending to
others who looked like they were in a marriage-like relationship. As
we will see below, that approach leaves some individuals who may
be victims of domestic violence underprotected.
B. Domestic Violence Protection Today
Today, all states prohibit domestic violence. States enforce these
rules through enhanced criminal law penalties as well as civil
protection orders. Nonetheless, states do not always use the same
definition of who is protected in the criminal and civil context
because of the piecemeal way that they have enacted domestic
violence laws.6" States fall into five categories with respect to the
coverage of the adult victims of domestic violence. As reflected in
64. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (citing representative statutes).
65. One criticism of these reforms is that, aside from consideration of the Minneapolis
study, none of these reforms were based on empirical research demonstrating their
effectiveness. See FAGAN, supra note 54. This Article does not seek to enter the debate about
which types of legal measures are most effective in dealing with the problem of domestic
violence. Instead, this Article argues that whatever legal approaches are used should protect
those who are likely to be victims of domestic violence. The piecemeal, marriage-mimicry
model has left some individuals outside the scope of protection. This Article also does not
discuss the enforcement problems that may exist in the law of domestic violence. Some studies
suggest that the enforcement mechanisms are strongly related to the effectiveness of the law
of domestic violence. Unenforced protection orders, for example, "can prove harmful to victims
by creating a false sense of security." See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE, ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS, LEGAL SERIES BULL., Jan. 2002, at 5,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovd/publications/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin4/
ncj189190.pdf.
66. Because the civil and criminal codes are typically codified in different sections of a
state's statutes, it is not clear that the difference in coverage is deliberate. Appendix B
documents which states use more than one definition of who is protected under their law of
domestic violence. Some states, such as Alabama and Delaware, provide broader protection
under the criminal law than the civil law, and others, such as Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin,
provide broader protection under civil law than criminal law. See infra Appendix B.
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Appendix B, the state laws (1) only cover individuals in opposite-sex
relationships, (2) cover individuals in a "dating relationship," (3)
cover individuals who live in the same household, (4) explicitly cover
same-sex relationships, or (5) have enacted a same-sex marriage
ban that might preclude application of domestic violence law to
same-sex partners.
Four states (Delaware, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South
Carolina) are in the first category; they have chosen explicitly to
provide legal recourse only to opposite-sex or married partners.67
In addition, Montana covers household members as well as
opposite-sex persons who are dating.' A 1993 amendment to the
Montana code served to narrow the scope of who was covered under
Montana law by defining partners to include only opposite-sex
relationships. 9
Courts have interpreted state statutes to include an opposite-sex
requirement even when the statute does not contain such an explicit
requirement. As recently as 1994, for example, the California courts
interpreted the "cohabiting" requirement in the spousal abuse
criminal law statute to require the individuals to be "an unrelated
man and woman living together in a substantial relationship-one
manifested, minimally, by permanence and sexual or amorous
intimacy."7 ° This restriction to opposite-sex couples survived an
67. Delaware protects spouses, "[flormer spouses [and] a man and a woman co-habiting
together with or without a child of either or both, or a man and a woman living separate and
apart with a child in common." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(2)(b) (1999). Louisiana only
protects "spouses" or "opposite sex" couples who presently or formerly lived in the same
household. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(4) (Supp. 2005). Lesser protection is provided to "[a]
victim of a dating partner," which includes "any person who is or has been in a social
relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim." Id. § 46:2151(B). North
Carolina covers "persons of the opposite sex who are in a dating relationship or have been in
a dating relationship." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(b)(6) (2003). A 'dating relationship" is defined
as a relationship 'wherein the parties are romantically involved over time and on a
continuous basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary
fraternization between persons in a business or social context is not a dating relationship."
Id. South Carolina protects "spouses, former spouses, ... persons who have a child in common,
and a male and female who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
25-10 (2003).
68. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(2)(b) (2005).
69. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206, Compiler's Cmts. at 264 (2005).
70. People v. Silva, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 184 n.6 (Ct. App. 1994).
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equal protection challenge,7' although it appears that the rule no
longer applies only to opposite-sex couples.72
Some states do not limit coverage to opposite-sex couples but,
instead, cover those in a "spouse-like" relationship. Indiana's
criminal code, for example, provides legal recourse to those who are
"similarly situated to a spouse."73 Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia laws cover those who are "living as a spouse."74 With
states increasingly enacting same-sex marriage bans,7" it is not clear
whether these "living as a spouse" rules preclude coverage of same-
sex couples. They do certainly reflect the marriage-mimicry model
underlying domestic violence legislation.
All states provide legal recourse to married individuals who are
victims of domestic violence. In addition, they typically cover other
individuals under a marriage-mimicry model. States in category
two inquire into whether the couple has a sexual or intimate or
dating relationship. These "dating relationships" must usually be of
a long-term nature. Massachusetts covers those in a "substantive
dating or engagement relationship" as determined by a court.7" New
Mexico covers a "person with whom the petitioner has had a
continuing personal relationship."77 North Carolina covers those in
a "dating relationship" wherein "the parties are romantically
involved over time and on a continuous basis during the course of
the relationship."7" Most of the other states provide coverage to
individuals in a long-term, dating relationship as well as individuals
who cohabit together.79
71. Id. at 187.
72. The domestic violence statute has been used to provide a protection order to a woman
against a woman who she publicly "married." See Annette F. v. Sharon S., 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d
100, 104-06 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that Sharon obtained a three-year restraining order
against Annette). Nonetheless, California law does require a "romantic or friendly"
relationship in order for the domestic violence statute to apply. See O'Kane v. Irvine, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 549, 550 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the domestic violence statute does not apply
to a woman who is allegedly abused by a man who, like herself, sublets a bedroom in a house).
73. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-6.3 (LexisNexis 2004).
74. OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)(3)-(4) (West 2000); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6102(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-204 (LexisNexis 2004).
75. Appendix B lists the states that have a same-sex marriage ban under statutory law
or state constitutional law. See infra Appendix B.
76. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 1 (West 1998).
77. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(D) (West 2003).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-1(b)(6) (West 2003).
79. See infra Appendix B (listing Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, D.C., Hawaii,
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The problems with the "dating" model can be seen in a District of
Columbia case, Sandoval v. Mendez.s° Julia Sandoval testified that
she was beaten in her own home by Jos6 Mendez, who was the
boyfriend of her cousin." She also testified that they had no
relationship although they "used to live together."82 The court ruled
that Sandoval was not entitled to a civil protection order because
she did not have an intimate relationship with the defendant.'
Sandoval would appear to be the type of individual who may fall
between the cracks under the traditional marital model. She seems
to have lived in a Spanish-speaking household with four individu-
als-herself, her boyfriend, her cousin, and her cousin's boyfriend.
When she faced abuse, she testified that she did not know any
English so she went to her brother's house to call the police; instead,
she found police on the street." Despite her lack of English-
speaking ability, she managed to navigate the justice system to seek
a civil protection order but was told by the court that she was not
eligible for a protection order from the defendant because they did
not have an intimate relationship. 5
The "dating relationship" rule can also fail to cover individuals
who went on one "date" but did not have a long-term relationship.
For example, Alison C. sought a civil protection order against David
Westcott after he took her in a car to a deserted parking lot,
"indicated that he had a gun, sat on top of her, and 'touch[ed] [her]
breasts and put[] his hands down [her] pants'" while she "repeatedly
told him to stop touching her."" They were together on that occasion
because they were supposed to go to lunch together on a "date.""
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, WestVirginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming as providing such coverage).
80. 521 A.2d 1168 (D.C. 1987).
81. Sandoval testified that "Mr. Mendez was punching her in the mouth and in the head."
Id. at 1170.
82. Id. at 1171.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1170.
85. The District of Columbia uses the same definition under its criminal law, so the
district also could not prosecute the defendant for domestic abuse. See D.C. CODE § 16-1001(5)
(2001).
86. Alison C. v. Westcott, 798 N.E.2d 813, 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (quoting the plaintiff).
87. Id. at 817.
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The trial court judge refused to dismiss the petition seeking a civil
protection order because the parties were "not engaged in a dating
relationship" as required by Illinois law to receive a protection
order.as On appeal, however, the Illinois court found that one date
could not constitute a "dating relationship." "The relationship was
brief and not exclusive. Any prospect of a romantic relationship was,
in short, quashed at the outset."89 Because the woman rebuffed
David's advances, she could not seek a civil protection order.9s Like
the District of Columbia, Illinois uses the same definition for
criminal liability and a civil protection order, so the state could not
prosecute Westcott for domestic abuse.9 '
States in category three merely require that the couple has been
cohabiting together. The "living together" requirement can also
produce problems because courts frequently require a marriage-like
long-term relationship to satisfy the cohabitation requirement. For
example, Florida requires that the individuals have been "residing
together as if a family" for the purposes of a civil protection order or
criminal liability.92 Lois Wright sought a civil protection order
against Thaddeus Slovenski after he allegedly committed repeated
acts of battery against her.9" Although Wright testified that she and
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The "dating relationship" requirement also proved problematic in a Massachusetts
case. The plaintiff's mother sought a protection order on behalf of her fifteen-year-old
daughter after she was allegedly forcibly sexually assaulted by her boyfriend. See C.O. v.
M.M., 815 N.E.2d 582,585 (Mass. 2004). The mother's testimony that the parties had "go[nel
out" was not sufficient to meet the plaintiffs burden of proving a substantive dating
relationship. Id. at 588-89.
91. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/112A-3 (West Supp. 2005).
92. FLA STAT. ANN. § 741.28(3) (West 2005) (protective order); id. § 741.283 (criminal
liability).
93. Slovenski v. Wright, 849 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Women in other
nonhousehold situations have also been found not to be covered by Florida law. See Sharpe
v. Sharpe, 695 So. 2d 1302, 1303-04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling that a widow of the
defendant's brother was not able to obtain a domestic violence injunction because she did not
reside in the same household as the defendant and was not related by blood or marriage);
Evans v. Evans, 599 So. 2d 205, 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a stepmother was
not able to obtain a domestic violence injunction because she did not ever live in the same
dwelling unit with the defendant). A man was also unable to obtain a domestic violence
injunction in Florida because he did not meet the statutory definition of a protected class. See
Partlowe v. Gomez, 801 So. 2d 968, 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that a maternal
grandfather and temporary custodian of a child was not eligible to seek an injunction against
the child's father after he allegedly threatened plaintiff with violence and poked at his body
with his finger while yelling at him in the presence of the child).
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Slovenski had a two-year romantic relationship, she was not able
to obtain a protection order because the court found the parties had
maintained separate residences. 9 4 The court found that "to establish
standing under [the] statute, something more than a romantic
relationship with overnight visits is required."95 The Florida statute
has been found to apply to same-sex couples due to a provision that
says no one should be denied relief "solely on the basis that such a
person is not a spouse." 6 But same-sex couples, like opposite-sex
couples, must fit the marital model by living together as a family.
The same household requirement has proven problematic for
some women in Connecticut. 8 For example, Raquel James sought
a civil protection order against William Wynn after he allegedly held
a gun to her head and threatened her life if she left him.9 The court
denied the protection order because Wynn was residing with his
wife and four children at the time, although he spent the night and
left clothes at the James' home. °° Connecticut uses the same
94. Slovenski, 849 So. 2d at 350.
95. Id.
96. Peterman v. Meeker, 855 So. 2d 690,691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting FLA. STAT.
§ 741.30(1)(e) (2002)).
97. See id. Similarly, the California civil protection statute has been found not to apply
to a woman who alleged that she was abused by a man who, like herself, subletted a bedroom
in a house, because they did not have a "romantic or friendly" relationship. O'Kane v. Irvine,
54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 550, 552 (Ct. App. 1996).
98. It has also proven problematic for various alleged victims in New Jersey because the
courts have found that the parties had not lived in the same household for a number of years.
In each case, the relationship is not one that looks like marriage at all, because it involves
family or mere acquaintances. See, e.g., Smith v. Moore, 689 A.2d 145,147-48 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997) (holding that the state's anti-domestic violence law did not apply when the
perpetrator was the former girlfriend of the victim's boyfriend, with whom she only shared
the same household during a vacation, despite harassment in the form of obscene phone calls
late at night); Sisco v. Sisco, 686 A.2d 792, 793 (N.J Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (finding no
domestic relationship for fifteen years between father and daughter; defendant allegedly
'physically assaulted plaintiff, fracturing her nose and causing her to sustain other personal
injuries"); Sperling v. Teplitsky, 683 A.2d 244, 245 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (refusing
restraining order when no domestic relationship existed for previous five years although the
defendant "kicked a car, then occupied by plaintiff and owned by her live-in boyfriend, at least
ten times, resulting in numerous and sundry dents to the vehicle").
99. James v. Wynn, No. FA 980150286, 1999 Conn. Super LEXIS 198, at *1-2 (Super. Ct.
Jan. 28, 1999).
100. Id. at *3-4. The Connecticut statute was subsequently amended to cover those who are
in a "dating relationship." See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38a (West 2004). That
amendment might have produced a different result in the James case. The household
requirement has also proven problematic for women in Hawaii. In one case, Hawaii sought
to prosecute Joshua Puaoi after a police officer observed Puaoi "holding [Darling Phillips]
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definition for civil and criminal law purposes, so the state would
have faced the same problem if it tried to prosecute Wynn for
domestic abuse.'0 ' The same household requirement has also been
problematic for some women in New York. Susan Orellana sought
a civil protection order against her former stepfather, Mario
Escalante. °2 He had raped her when she was eleven years old and,
most recently, had been stalking her.'0 3 Because her mother had
divorced Escalante and she did not live in the same household with
him, the court did not have jurisdiction to grant the requested
relief.'04 In New York, the criminal law provides an even narrower
category of coverage than the civil law. Additional criminal sanc-
tions are only available for those who are "legally married,"
"formerly married," or who "have a child in common."10 5
The Iowa Supreme Court has adopted a six-factor test (drawn
from California case law) to determine whether a couple is cohabit-
ing for the purposes of criminal law enforcement of domestic abuse
assault. These factors include
(1) sexual relations between the parties while
sharing the same living quarters;
(2) sharing of income or expenses;
(3) joint use or ownership of property;
(4) whether the parties hold themselves out as
husband and wife;
(5) the continuity of the relationship; and
(6) the length of the relationship. 1 6
against a tree" and "slap[ing] [her] twice on the left side of the face." State v. Puaoi, 891 P.2d
272, 274 (Haw. 1995). The conviction was reversed because of an absence of evidence that
Puaoi and Phillips were family or household members. Id. at 272. The Hawaii statute was
subsequently amended to include those in a "dating relationship," which may have produced
a different result in the Puaoi case. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 2004). Similarly, the
household requirement has proven problematic for some women in New York. See Groves v.
State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 707 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262-63 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that no
protection order was available for a college student after two altercations with Groves because
they did not live in the same household).
101. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38h (West 2004).
102. Orellana v. Escalante, 653 N.Y.S.2d 992, 992 (App. Div. 1997).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 993.
105. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 530.11 (Consol. 1996); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.12
(Consol. Supp. 2005).
106. State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 1996) (quoting People v. Holifield, 252
Cal. Rptr. 729, 734 (Ct. App. 1988)).
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Applying these factors, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed a
conviction (based on overly broad jury instructions) involving a fact
pattern in which an unmarried man and woman kept living together
in separate bedrooms after they ended their sexual relationship.
10 7
The State charged Francis Kellogg with domestic abuse assault
after he kicked Johanna Bunting with spurred boots and hit her.0'
The police reported that Bunting had "bruises, scabs, black eyes,
and swelling.""° Because the judge had given an overly broad jury
instruction under which "mere roommates" could obtain statutory
protection, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial."0
In specifying these six factors, the Iowa Supreme Court noted
that these factors fulfill the purpose of protecting "the large number
of couples who live as husband and wife without the formal aspect
of marriage.""' These six factors therefore deliberately follow a
marriage-mimicry model under which a woman does not receive
legal recourse from domestic abuse if she is a "mere roommate" with
her alleged abuser, or does not live with her abuser at all. These
factors also emphasize financial interdependence, which is not
necessarily an aspect of modern relationships."'
Other states have adopted these six factors, often in the context
of requests for civil protection orders. For example, Laura Wiley
sought a civil protection order against Charles Barnett after he
allegedly "approached her car, banged on the window, threatened to
kill her, and followed her in his vehicle in a reckless manner after
she drove away.""3 The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that Wiley
did not come within the group covered by the domestic violence
107. Id.
108. Id. at 515.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 518.
111. Id.
112. Relying on the case law from many other states, Ohio reduces the cohabitation test
to two factors: "financial support and consortium." See State v. Yaden, 692 N.E.2d 1097, 1101
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997). The emphasis on financial support is consistent with a traditional
definition of marriage in which the parties share finances. It is not consistent with the
suggestion of many feminists that women maintain financial independence within marriage.
For example, Marjorie Kornhauser has critiqued the traditional definition of marital
relationships found in our tax laws. See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and
the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63
(1993); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership Model of Marriage
in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413 (1996).
113. Barnett v. Wiley, 103 S.W.3d 17, 18 (Ky. 2003).
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statute because she did not live with her alleged abuser and
therefore could not satisfy the statutory "living together" require-
ment.'14 In justifying its interpretation of Kentucky law, the state
supreme court quoted with approval a treatise that explained that
the purpose of the domestic violence statute was to "protect
victims from harm caused by the persons whose intimate physical
relationship to the victim increases the danger of harm, either
because the parties live in physical proximity or because the
relationship is one whose intimacy may disable the victim from
seeking protection."" 5 That justification fits the conventional
marital model under which we assume that women live with their
long-term partners. In this case, however, the lower court found that
Barnett and Wiley dated for five years although they never
cohabited." 6 Wiley was clearly at risk of violence from Barnett, who
apparently was willing to use his automobile as an offensive
weapon, but she could not obtain a civil protection order because she
had the good sense to not live with him. One can well imagine that
Wiley is now afraid to leave her home out of fear of Barnett because
she had the good sense not to ever live with him.
One category of women who are often not covered by states with
a cohabitation requirement is pregnant women who do not live with
their sexual partners. Nearly every state allows a woman to obtain
a civil protection order against a child's father after she has given
birth to the child;"' legal recourse often does not exist against the
114. Id. at 20-21; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720(3) (LexisNexis 1999) (protecting
a "member of an unmarried couple who are living together or have formerly lived together").
115. Barnett, 103 S.W.2d at 19 (quoting 15 LOUISE E. GRAHAM & JAMES E. KELLER,
KENTUCKY PRACTICE: DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 5.1, at 107 (2d ed. 1997)).
116. See Brief for Appellee at 4, Barnett v. Wiley, 103 S.W.3d 17 (Ky. 2003) (No. 2002-SC-
180-D), 2002 WL 32500639 (citing Order of Franklin Circuit Court, TR 16-17 (first volume)).
117. Most states explicitly cover individuals who have a child in common. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 30-5-2(a)(4) (LexisNexis 1998) ("child in common"); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5) (2004)
("persons who have a child of the relationship"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601.A (3) (2001)
("[the victim or the defendant is pregnant by the other party"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-302
(Supp. 2005) ("child in common"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e)(1) (West 1999) ("a person who is
the parent of the defendant's child"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38a(2) (2004) ("child in
common"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(2) (1999) ("child in common"); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
741.28 (West 2005) ("persons who are parents of a child in common"); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1
(2004) ("persons who are parents of the same child"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 2004)
("child in common"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303(6) (2002) ("child in common"); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/112A-3 (West Supp. 2005) ("child in common"); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-44.8(a)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2005) ("child in common"); IOWA CODE § 236.2(2) (Supp. 2005) ("persons
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man who impregnated her if she has not yet given birth' despite
the evidence that women face a heightened risk of abuse when they
are pregnant."' Only five states offer explicit coverage to women
who are pregnant. 2 °
Some courts justify narrow interpretation of their domestic
violence statutes as necessary to limit the swelling case loads of
courts that hear domestic violence cases. For example, a New Jersey
court explained its failure to issue a civil protection order to a
woman who was receiving harassing phone calls from the former
girlfriend of her current boyfriend, with whom she had briefly
who are parents of the same minor child"). Other states cover those who have been in an
"intimate relationship." See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(2) (2004); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:1(XV) (LexisNexis 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(8) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1101(2) (2002). In most cases, the existence of a child in common is evidence of an
intimate relationship. Two states-Louisiana and Mississippi-appear to provide no
protection solely based on the fact that two people have a child in common. Even the states
with a "child in common" rule can have victims of domestic violence fall between the cracks.
See, e.g., Sowich v. Taurisano, 682 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Faro. Ct. 1998) (holding that a woman was
not able to obtain protection order against the biological father of her child because she had
relinquished the child for adoption).
118. See, e.g., People v. Ward, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 531, 532, 536 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that
a pregnant woman was not able to obtain protection order against the father of her unborn
child after he allegedly "grabbed her arms, pushed her down, grabbed her by the hair and
slammed her head into the closet door, slapped her, and squeezed her neck"); Gallagher v.
Staszewski, No. F95-02495085, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2371, at *7 (Super. Ct. Aug. 11,
1995) (ruling that a pregnant woman was unable to obtain a protection order because she did
not come within the protected class); Gina C. v. Stephen F., 576 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (Faro. Ct.
1991) (holding that a pregnant, unmarried woman was not permitted to seek a protection
order against the father of her unborn child); see also Woodin v. Rasmussen, 455 N.W.2d 535,
536 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a pregnant woman was not able to obtain a protective
order against the father of her unborn child who allegedly "threatened her with bodily harm
and to kill her"). Under current Minnesota law, Woodin might prevail because the statute
includes "persons involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01 (West Supp. 2005).
119. See Ruth Colker, Abortion and Violence, 1 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 93, 101-04
(1994) (citing statistics that women are at a heightened risk during pregnancy, especially if
they are considering an abortion).
120. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601.A.3 (2001) ("[tlhe victim or the defendant is
pregnant by the other party"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3412a(c)(1) (Supp. 2004) ("a man and
woman if the woman is pregnant and the man is alleged to be the father, regardless of
whether they have been married or have lived together at any time"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
518B.01 (West Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19d (West 2005) ("any person, regardless
of age, who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has a
child in common, or with whom the victim anticipates having a child in common, if one of the
parties is pregnant"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 2005) ("is the biological parent of the
other party's unborn child").
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shared a household, by recounting the "burgeoning domestic
violence case-load in the Superior Court," and citing statistics
reflecting that the caseload had nearly doubled from 1991 to 1996.121
This desire to keep the caseload manageable may be causing courts
to employ a marriage-mimicry model that will keep out some cases
involving individuals who have not been in an intimate, long-term
relationship. Hence, the New Jersey court quoted the New Jersey
legislature, stating in its findings that it is "the intent of the
Legislature to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum
protection from abuse the law can provide," while also citing with
approval numerous cases in which the New Jersey courts had failed
to find the existence of a covered domestic situation.'22 It described
the parties' situation as "jealousy over the affections of a young
man, a scenario doubtless as old as recorded time ... and surely not
within the contemplation of the Legislature."'23 The evidence in this
case reflected harassing phone calls at 12:15 a.m., during which the
defendant allegedly called the victim a "slut" and told her to "fuck
off.""2 The court's reasoning suggested that state law would also not
cover the victim if the defendant came to her house to engage in this
harassing behavior. 125 One can well understand why the victim may
have wanted a civil protection order to avoid this next step. Was the
court stereotypically assuming that a woman would never escalate
her anger against another woman to a more violent confrontation?
The law of domestic violence has changed dramatically in the past
century. Initially, the law of domestic violence was needed to
respond to the problem that a married woman had no legal recourse
if her husband beat her. The law prohibited such battery outside of
marriage.12 A woman needed the law of domestic violence to give
her the same legal recourse within the domestic sphere of marriage.
Over time, however, the law of domestic violence has gone beyond
the "leveling the playing field" rationale. Today, the law of domestic
violence provides enhanced legal recourse to victims of assault
within the domestic sphere as compared with assault outside the
121. Smith v. Moore, 689 A.2d 145, 146, 147 n.3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1997).
122. Id. at 148; see also id. at 147 (citing other New Jersey cases).
123. Id. at 148.
124. Id. at 146.
125. See id. at 147-48.
126. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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domestic sphere through a system of civil protection orders,
warrantless arrest, and enhanced criminal penalties.127 Further, the
law of domestic violence has expanded its scope of coverage to
include more than married women; it typically covers all individuals
in long-term intimate relationships who face violence in their
households from their partners. 28 Yet, those individuals were not
historically exempted from the law of assault and battery if they
were unmarried. The "leveling the playing field" rationale would not
explain the extension of the law of domestic violence to those
individuals.
So what is the current theory underlying the law of domestic
violence? Is it a law of intimate violence, designed to provide legal
recourse to those who may face battery from an intimate partner?
Under that theory, one might argue that battery by an intimate
partner is more harmful than battery from others, because of the
violation of trust that occurs in the context of battery by an intimate
partner. Or is it a law of household violence, designed to provide
legal recourse to those who may face battery in their home? Under
that theory, one might argue that individuals particularly need to
feel safe in their homes so special legal protections are appropriate
to safeguard the home.
If the law of domestic violence is a law of intimate violence, then
it is underprotective because it does not provide legal recourse to a
woman who rebuffs a man's advances after one date and does not
cover a woman who is battered by an intimate partner who is
married to another woman. If the law of domestic violence is a law
of household violence, then it is underprotective because it does not
provide legal recourse to a woman who lives in an apartment or
boarding house with a man with whom she is not intimate but who
seeks to batter her.
One might respond to these observations by noting that the law
can never perfectly provide legal recourse to those in need of
protection. The law often uses imperfect proxies to define who gets
privileges and benefits. Unless the law reflects an inappropriate
bias, we must tolerate such imperfection. But marital status, like
race, gender, religion, and national origin, should be the type of
127. See supra note 26.
128. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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classification that creates heightened scrutiny, and a corresponding
suspicion of inappropriate use as a proxy for other characteristics.'29
In addition, the marriage-mimicry model reflects a middle-class
bias. The middle class is more likely to have long-term marriages. 3 °
Middle-class people are also more likely to be able to have control
over the nature and structure of their households. The cases
involving women living in boarding houses or apartment situations
represent poor women. Poor women are more at risk of violence in
their lives than middle-class women.' 3 ' Yet, the law of domestic
violence is structured around a middle-class expectation of control
over one's household. If the law of domestic violence reflected a more
functional approach, then it might better provide legal recourse for
a broader range of women in our society.
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE LAW OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
While the domestic violence movement has been engaging in a
marriage-mimicry model for defining who is protected under its
statutes, the gay rights movement has also been engaging in a
marriage-mimicry model to extend the privileges and benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples. The problem with the marriage
extension strategy is that it simply moves the fault line with respect
129. Admittedly, this is a complicated argument. Marriage is a fundamental right under
the Constitution. Hence, the state is not allowed to burden the right to marry. See Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390 (1978). But the state is not merely neutral with respect to
marriage; it privileges marriage. The federal government, for example, provides 1049 benefits
on the basis of marital status. See supra note 5. Arguably, some of the privacy cases stand for
the proposition that the state cannot privilege marriage, at least in the criminal context. See,
e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972). If marital status cannot be a proxy for
benefits, then each of those programs would have to be reconsidered on a functional basis. At
a minimum, heightened rational basis review would require justification of benefits rather
than automatic awarding of benefits.
130. See generally David J. Fein, Married and Poor: Basic Characteristics of Economically
Disadvantaged Couples in the U.S. 4 (Supporting Healthy Marriage Evaluation, Working
Paper No. SHM-01, 2004), available at httpJ/www.mdrc.org/publications/393/ workpaper.pdf
(finding that people with economic disadvantages are as likely to marry as middle-class people
but "their marriages are substantially more unstable").
131. See ELEANOR LYON, NATL ELECTRONIC NETWORK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
WELFARE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LESSONS FROM RESEARCH (2002),
httpJ/www.vawnet.orgDomesticViolence/Research/VAWnetDocs/AR-Welfare2.pdf ("[Ploor
women experience violence by their partners at higher rates, partly because they have fewer
options." (citations omitted)).
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to who is left without legal recourse. Same-sex couples who marry
can come under the umbrella of statutory coverage, but others who
are in nonmarital situations are still left without legal recourse.
Further, the people left without legal recourse no longer have the
gay rights movement as their ally. They become even more politi-
cally powerless. Finally, same-sex couples now often face the same
dilemma as opposite-sex couples-they need to embrace the
institution of marriage (or domestic partnership) to receive privi-
leges and benefits. Rather than challenge why we tie marriage to
privileges and benefits, they accept the marital model as the
appropriate model.
A. The Extension Strategy
Gay rights advocates have written many articles and books
arguing for'32 (and in some cases against'33 ) same-sex marriage.3
The general argument for same-sex marriage is that same-sex
couples should be able to benefit from the emotional, social, and
legal consequences of marriages that have long been available to
opposite-sex partners.1 35 The few courts that have favorably
considered these equal protection arguments have ruled that same-
sex couples must be permitted to enter the institution of marriage
or its equivalent.'36 Rather than question why benefits are tied to
marriage, they have adopted the "marriage-extension" remedy.
A secondary problem that also underlies the marriage extension
argument is that courts are generally oblivious to the protections or
132. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal
Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 567 (1994).
133. See, e.g., Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for, supra note 1, at 1536-37.
134. For a balanced collection of essays, see generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL
AND LEGAL DEBATE, supra note 14.
135. ESKRIDGE, supra note 132, at 124. The American Law Institute has endorsed the
extension strategy by recommending that separating couples who meet the definition of
"domestic partners" receive the same economic benefits and protections as divorcing spouses.
See Am. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.02-.04 (2002). For a general discussion, see Polikoff, Making
Marriage Matter Less, supra note 1.
136. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
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obligations provided by the law of marriage when they consider the
marriage extension argument. 3 7 Their approach is purely a benefits
approach. 38 This secondary problem causes the problem of domestic
violence to be invisible during the same-sex marriage debate. If
courts had focused on the protections provided by the law of
marriage, possibly they would have seen why a disentanglement
model would be preferable to an extension model.
The Hawaii Supreme Court was the first court to favorably
consider the equal protection extension argument by examining
what it called the "multiplicity of rights and benefits that are
contingent upon [the status of marriage]."' The court then
proceeded to list fourteen of these rights and benefits. 4 ° Hidden in
the list of fourteen, however, were actually some obligations of
marriage: the awarding of child custody and support payments in
divorce proceedings, the right to spousal support, the right to file a
nonsupport action, and post-divorce rights relating to support and
property division.' The list, however, did not go so far as to
mention the possibility of violence within a marital relationship, so
there is no mention of the law of rape or battery as it applies to
married couples. The Hawaii Supreme Court decision was followed
by a report by Hawaii's Commission on Sexual Orientation and
the Law.'4 2 The Commission was charged with examining "the
major legal and economic benefits extended to married opposite-sex
couples, but not to same-sex couples." 43 In response to this
charge, it created an extensive report which focused entirely on
benefits and did not even list the obligations noted by the Hawaii
Supreme Court.' Both the Hawaii Supreme Court and the Hawaii
Commission suggested that the solution to this problem of unequal
benefits was to create a marriage-like status for same-sex couples.
137. See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59 (listing the "rights and benefits" accorded to married
persons under Hawaii law).
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. STATE OF HAWAII, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW
(1995), available at http'//www.hawaii.gov/lrb/rpts95/sol/soldoc.html.
143. Id. at 1.
144. See id. at app. B.
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The needs of the victims of domestic violence were not a concern
of the Hawaii Supreme Court or the Hawaii Commission when they
considered the unequal status of nonmarried couples. In fact,
Hawaii law was, at the time, quite inadequate for the victims of
domestic violence because it limited coverage to "spouses and former
spouses."45
Despite the recommendation of the Hawaii Commission, Hawaii
did not make marriage available to same-sex partners because
the voters amended the Hawaii Constitution to preclude this
possibility.146 Instead, Hawaii created a "reciprocal beneficiaries"
status under which same-sex partners could register with the state
and receive the state-sanctioned benefits of marriage4 v as listed in
the Hawaii Commission report. Fortunately for the victims of same-
sex domestic violence, the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act did create
legal recourse from domestic violence for "reciprocal beneficiaries"
and "former reciprocal beneficiaries," 48 mimicking the marital
language in the prior version of Hawaii law.
The Hawaii marital-mimicry solution created a new fault line in
the domestic violence arena. It left individuals who were not
married or registered domestic partners without legal recourse from
domestic violence. The interpretation clause that accompanied this
revision directed the courts to interpret this law narrowly.'49 The
Hawaii legislature's recognition that same-sex couples did need
legal recourse from domestic violence created a new fault line in the
marriage debate. With the addition of "reciprocal beneficiaries" to
the list of who may obtain legal recourse from domestic violence, the
state moved the line of statutory coverage but left unmarried
opposite-sex and unregistered same-sex couples without legal
recourse.
Hawaii has subsequently supplemented its coverage of domestic
violence to include individuals in dating relationships or individuals
145. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 586-1, 709-906 (1993).
146. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (amended 1998).
147. Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, §§ 1-5, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383.
148. Id. § 64 (amending HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1); id. § 70 (amending HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 709-906).
149. The interpretation clause states: "Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the
rights and benefits extended by this Act shall be narrowly interpreted and nothing in this Act
shall be construed nor implied to create or extend rights or benefits not specifically provided
herein." Id. § 74.
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who live together.15 ° These rules can cover individuals who are in
marriage-like relationships reflected by cohabitation or a significant
long-term dating relationship. They were, however, no help to
Darling Phillips after a police officer observed that Joshua Puaoi
held her against a tree and slapped her twice on the left side of the
face because Phillips had the good sense not to have a long-term,
cohabitating relationship with Puaoi."5' Like many other states,
Hawaii keeps amending its domestic violence statute to bring more
individuals into the marriage-mimicry model without asking who is
at risk for domestic violence.
Vermont, Massachusetts, and Nebraska have also favorably
considered the equal protection argument in the same-sex marriage
context through an equal benefits approach.'52 Vermont considered
the "benefits and protections incident to a marriage license" as part
of its analysis.'53 Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court devoted several pages of its landmark same-sex marriage
opinion to listing the many tangible and intangible consequences
that flow from the law of marriage.'54 Finally, the Nebraska district
court favorably considered various arguments that the ban on same-
sex marriage violates the United States Constitution.'55 It favorably
considered the marriage benefits extension argument.
56
These states also use the marriage-mimicry model to define who
should be covered by the law of domestic violence. The Vermont
domestic violence statute requires the accused and the victim to
have a "sexual" or "dating" relationship if they are not married.'57
Massachusetts requires the individuals to have a "substantive
dating or engagement relationship" if they are not married.'58
Finally, Nebraska requires the individuals to have a "dating
150. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (Supp. 2004).
151. See State v. Puaoi, 891 P.2d 272, 274, 278 (Haw. 1995).
152. See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 997-1000 (D. Neb.
2005); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,954-57 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 883-84 (Vt. 1999).
153. Baker, 744 A.2d at 883-84.
154. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954-57. At the end of this recitation, the court observed:
'lilt is undoubtedly for these concrete reasons, as well as for its intimately personal
significance, that civil marriage has long been termed a 'civil right." Id. at 957.
155. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 997-1000, 1005.
156. Id. at 997-1000.
157. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101(2) (2002).
158. MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 1 (West 1998).
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relationship" with each other if they are not married.159 The law
of domestic violence in these states is even narrower than in
Hawaii because they do not have the "household member" rule for
coverage. 60
But what if these four courts had not accepted the marriage
extension remedy argument? If, instead, they had ruled that a state
may not condition any privilege or benefit on marital status, then
the presumption of a marriage-like model for domestic violence
would also be challenged. Individuals should not have to be married
or "dating" in order to receive enhanced legal recourse from
domestic violence. A woman might face abuse from a man with
whom she is sharing a household although they are not intimate. In
fact, she may face abuse because she does not want to have an
intimate relationship with him. An individual needs legal recourse
from abuse through the law of domestic violence if the abuser is
likely to threaten the tranquility of the person's residence. If we stop
thinking of that problem through a marriage-mimicry lens, then we
may be able to define more appropriately who is in need of statutory
coverage.
One problem with the marriage-extension remedy is that it
causes fiscal conservatives to be hesitant on economic, rather than
moral, grounds to extend marriage to same-sex couples. 6' They
perceive the same-sex marriage movement as entailing a significant
financial cost. But what is lost in this discussion is how the law of
marriage, generally, is a very expensive legal development. Recall
that a GAO report found that 1049 benefits are conditioned on
marriage under federal law.'62 What would happen if we used a
159. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-903(3) (2005). Married couples are explicitly listed as receiving
domestic violence protection, as well as those in a dating relationship or those who reside
together. Id.
160. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 586-1, 709-906 (Supp. 2004) (extending protection to
.persons jointly residing or formerly residing in the same dwelling unit"), with MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 1 (West 1998), NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (2005), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1101 (2002).
161. I can only offer anecdotal evidence in support of this argument. When Ohio was
considering its constitutional ban on same-sex marriage, I had discussions with various people
who described themselves as fiscal conservatives who told me that they were voting in favor
of the same-sex marriage ban to preclude Ohio from spending more money on benefits for
couples. If financial benefits were not attached to the institution of marriage, these people
suggested they would vote against Ohio's ban on same-sex marriage.
162. See Letter from Barry R. Bedrick to Henry J. Hyde, supra note 5, at 1-2.
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functional approach in thinking through each of these benefits to
see if those benefits should really be tied to marriage? A conven-
tional defense of the institution of marriage and its attendant
benefits is that marriage promotes positive childrearing. 63 Yet,
marital benefits flow to couples who never intend to have children,
never have children, or marry late in life so that having children
together is not a realistic possibility. And, of course, most of the
1049 federal benefits that are attached to marriage are not available
to children who are raised in household arrangements other than
marital arrangements. If the nurturing of children is the goal of
marital benefits, a functional approach could achieve that goal more
efficiently. 1"
B. Same-Sex Marriage Ban and Domestic Violence
Those in same-sex couples in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Vermont,
and Nebraska can at least take solace in the fact they have legal
recourse from domestic violence if they have a marriage-like
relationship with their partner. Individuals in states other than
Hawaii that have banned same-sex marriage are in a much worse
situation. They are often at risk of not being able to obtain legal
recourse if the domestic violence law is limited to individuals in
"spouse-like" relationships. That problem is particularly stark in
Ohio.165
163. See Robert P. George, What's Sex Got To Do with It? Marriage, Morality, and
Rationality, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 63, 64 (2004) ("'Marriage is a socially arranged solution for the
problem of getting people to stay together and care for children that the mere desire for
children, and the sex that makes children possible, does not solve. (quoting JAMES Q.
WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: How CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 41 (2002))).
164. Mechele Dickerson has used a functional approach to ask why federal bankruptcy
benefits should be granted based on marital status. See generally A. Mechele Dickerson,
Family Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal To Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits
Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 69 (1998). She "argues that
Congress should ignore marital status when awarding benefits to debtors in bankruptcy
cases." Id. at 71.
165. Prior to 2000, Michigan would have faced a similar problem because its domestic
violence statute was limited to spouses, former spouses, and intimate heterosexuals. See
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 400.1501 (West 1997). But the statute was revised in 2000 to
include all persons in a dating or sexual relationship. See MICH. COM. LAwS ANN. § 400.1501
(West Supp. 2005). The state's broad ban on same-sex marriage should have no effect on the
law of domestic violence because the law of domestic violence is not tied to the status of
marriage. See id.
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Ohio's law of domestic violence covers a "family or household
member. " 16 6 That term is defined to include an individual who is
"residing or has resided with" the alleged offender, and who is a
"spouse" or a "person living as a spouse."167 "Person living as a
spouse" is defined as a "person who is living or has lived with the
offender in a common law marital relationship, who otherwise is
cohabiting with the offender, or who otherwise has cohabited with
the offender within five years prior to the date of the alleged
commission of the act in question."' Prior to adoption of the state's
ban on same-sex marriage, this statute was interpreted to cover
same-sex couples.'69
The Ohio statute, however, has historically left women who were
not in a marriage-like relationship without legal recourse. The state
of Ohio sought a domestic violence charge on behalf of Bonita Likely
against James E. Cobb. 7 0 According to the trial testimony, Likely
was married to someone else and Cobb maintained his own
apartment.'7 ' Nonetheless, Cobb spent nearly every night at Likely's
apartment and kept sleepwear and slippers at her apartment. 172 He
had a key to her apartment. 173 Although a witness testified that
Cobb pushed his way into Likely's apartment after she told him that
she wished to terminate the relationship and assaulted her, the
court found that the State could not bring a domestic violence
charge because "a reasonable mind could not fairly find that the
relationship between Likely and Cobb involved cohabitation
[because] [tihere was no evidence of sharing of familial or financial
responsibilities. At most, there was a sporadic provision of money
and conjugal relations." 174 The fact that Likely was married to
another man probably made the court reluctant to conclude that she
had a spouse-like relationship with Cobb, despite the fact that they
had been dating for fifteen months before the incident.7 5
166. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (West Supp. 2005).
167. Id. § 2919.25(f).
168. Id. § 2919.25(f)(2).
169. See State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
170. State v. Cobb, 795 N.E.2d 73, 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
171. Id. at 75.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 75-76.
175. Nomnarried family members who do not "cohabit" are also left unprotected under
1876 [Vol. 47:1841
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The voters of Ohio have heightened the marriage-mimicry model
under Ohio law. On November 2, 2004, the voters adopted an
amendment to the state constitution. Under this amendment:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a
marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political
subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance or effect of marriage.171
The question raised by the existence of these two provisions is
whether the language in the Ohio Marriage Amendment precluding
the state from recognizing any marital-type relationship precludes
the application of the law of domestic violence to unmarried
couples. Five Ohio courts have considered this issue and have
reached conflicting decisions.177 The problem in Ohio, like the
Ohio's statute. Sherry and Russell Maglionico filed a petition for a domestic violence civil
protection order against Andrew Maglionico, who was Russell's brother. Maglionico v.
Maglionico, No. 2000-P-0115, 2001 Ohio LEXIS 8901 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2001).
Although Andrew did not live with Sherry and Russell, they feared domestic violence based
on his repeated threats to beat or shoot them. Id. at *7. Because there was no evidence that
the parties resided together, the domestic violence order was reversed. Id. at *11-12.
176. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
177. Compare State v. Ward, No. 05CR0269, slip. op. (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the
domestic violence statute does violate the Ohio Marriage Amendment), and State v. Carswell,
No. 05CR22077 (Ohio Ct. C.P. April 12, 2005) (same), with State v. Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the domestic violence statute is constitutional and can
coexist with the Ohio Marriage Amendment), and State v. Rodgers, 827 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. 2005) (same). The most interesting case is Phelps v. Johnson, No. DVO5 305642 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. Nov. 28, 2005), in which Judge James B. Celebrezze concluded that the Ohio Marriage
Amendment would preclude application of a domestic violence civil protection order to an
individual in a nonmarital relationship. He then concluded that the Marriage Amendment
violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it could not
pass the "rational basis test." He stated:
It is nearly impossible to divine the purpose for discrimination against
unmarried persons, although it is generally accepted that the architects of such
referendum ballot issues (across the country) were political operatives like Karl
Rove, who sought to guarantee that a certain demographic of voters would turn
out in large numbers at the polls to vote in the presidential election. Likewise,
the other end of the political spectrum promoted referendum issues that sought
to raise the minimum wage. The difference between these political efforts was
that the Rove side of it served to seriously confuse and complicate the law as it
pertains to protecting the victims of domestic violence. This Court finds that the
purpose behind Article XV, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution does not pass the
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problem in Hawaii, is that legal recourse from domestic violence has
been historically limited to spouses or those in "spouse-like"
relationships. A ban on same-sex marriage, therefore, can have the
consequence of leaving same-sex couples without legal recourse and
with no way to overcome that obstacle because marriage is not
available to them. 17
8
The Ohio situation, however, also reflects how political forces
have conspired to make it difficult to escape the marriage-mimicry
model. Although the religious Right historically opposed the
development of the law of domestic violence, today the religious
Right supports such measures. When the controversy arose in Ohio
about the meaning of the state same-sex marriage ban and the law
of domestic violence, the proponents of the same-sex marriage ban
indicated that Ohio courts should interpret the law of domestic
violence to cover same-sex couples. 179 Despite their fervent opposi-
tion to same-sex couples being allowed to marry, the religious
Right's leaders indicated that same-sex couples should be allowed
to benefit from a law that required a spouse-like relationship. In
other words, marriage mimicry was acceptable even if marriage,
itself, was not. The marriage-mimicry model is so strong that it is
even receiving some support from the religious Right. The marriage-
mimicry model becomes a vehicle to avoid having to permit same-
sex couples to actually marry.
Another way to understand the Ohio situation is that the
functional approach is beginning to rear its head as a way to wade
through a very confusing set of statutory and constitutional
provisions. The public now understands that unmarried partners
may face domestic violence and that the state has a role in prevent-
"rational basis test." Therefore, the second sentence of Article XV, Section 11 of
the Ohio Constitution (Issue 1) is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution (Equal Protections Clause) as it pertains to the Domestic
Violence Act in Ohio Law.
Id.
178. Appendix B notes which states have statutory or constitutional bans on same-sex
marriage. The overwhelming majority of states ban same-sex marriage. See infra Appendix
B.
179. See Bruce Cadwallader, It's Still Domestic Violence: Gay-Marriage Ban Has No Effect
on Law, Judge Rules, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 2005, at 01A (quoting Phil Burress,
Chairman of the Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage, as indicating that the organization
favors the application of domestic violence laws to same-sex couples).
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ing such violence. Thus, a law that requires a "spouse-like" relation-
ship is being contorted to cover individuals who may not marry
under state law because the violence they are facing in their
personal lives is so unacceptable. The irrationality of the "spouse-
like" requirement is so obvious that courts are looking the other way
rather than strictly interpreting that requirement.
III. THE DISENTANGLEMENT SOLUTION
The problem with the piecemeal approach to the law of domestic
violence under which the state tries to appease all the interested
parties-the Feminist movement, the religious Right, law and order
conservatives, and the liberal Left-is that we have an inadequate
law of domestic violence. Who is in need of the law of domestic
violence with its enhanced criminal penalties and availability of
civil protection orders, along with shelters and warrantless arrests?
How can the law best assist such individuals?
It is impossible to answer the question of who is in need of legal
recourse from domestic violence because we have framed the
research question through a marriage-mimicry lens in which we
presume that the parties have an intimate relationship.' ° For
example, one of the leading studies on domestic violence, published
in July 2000, examined the "extent, nature, and consequences of
intimate partner violence." 8' Buried in its findings, however, is
evidence that women in nonintimate relationships can be at
significant risk of domestic violence. Of 263 female stalking victims,
42.8% reported that their victimization started after their relation-
ship ended.'82 In states with cohabitation or substantial dating
requirements, many of these women may not be able to obtain civil
protection orders. But the data is insufficient to know how large the
gap in the law might be because the survey only inquired about
women who had been in "intimate" relationships with their stalkers.
180. Oddly, the law of domestic violence is often a law of intimate violence yet no state uses
the term "intimate violence" in its law.
181. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAVL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE,
EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (2000), available at httpJ/www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffles1/nij/181867.pdf.
182. Id. at 37.
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What about women who never agree to "date" a man at all? Who
never cohabitated with a man at all? How frequently might they be
"stalked" and desire a protection order? The existing law of domestic
violence could protect these women (without the enactment of
special antistalking legislation) by not having cohabitation and
substantial dating requirements as a prerequisite to a protection
order.
Another study entitled "Intimate Partner Violence" also lends
support to the notion that women need protection from acquain-
tances who may not fit the definitions contained in domestic
violence statutes.'3 In Table 3, the study put victims and their
offenders into four different categories: intimate partners, other
relatives, friends/acquaintances, and strangers.' The rates of
violent victimization from 1993 to 1998 for each of these four
categories were: 8.4%, 2.8%, 15.0%, and 12.9%, respectively.8 5 The
highest rate of victimization for women was in the friends /acquain-
tances category, which the report defines as friend/ex-friend,
roommate/boarder, schoolmate, neighbor, someone at work/
customer, or other nonrelative.'86 The report provides no discussion
of the nature of this victimization or the steps that might be taken
to prevent it. In most states, however, the law of domestic violence
would not cover these women because they are not in a significant
dating relationship or cohabiting with these perpetrators of
violence. Yet, the women know these abusers and might want a
protection order against them.
If we would write the law of domestic violence from scratch, we
need not get caught up in the question of the status of the relation-
ship of the two individuals. There is reason to believe that fear of a
homophobic reaction may cause some individuals in same-sex
relationships not to seek legal recourse from domestic violence.8 7 If
183. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DElfT OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 10 (2000) (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Special Report), available at httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf.
184. Id. at tbl.3.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 8.
187. See Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere While
Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 325, 337 (1999) ("Threats to
reveal the true nature of the relationship can provide the abuser with considerable
psychological (and economic) leverage because of the perceived costs associated with being gay
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MARRIAGE MIMICRY
they did not have to prove that they were sexually intimate or
"dating" their abuser, then they might feel more comfortable coming
forward to seek a protection order or seek criminal prosecution. 88
The piecemeal approach to the development of the law of domestic
violence, however, has caused the legislatures first to cover married
relationships and then to cover other relationships which seem to
mimic marriage. But we never stop to ask-why use the marital
model at all? As legislatures and courts abandon the marital model,
they should also abandon the "like-marriage" model as well.
Abandoning the marital model under the law of domestic violence
could be a good first step toward abandoning the marital model
generally. We need to examine each of the 1049 areas of federal law
that privilege marriage and ask who is in need of those protections.
Why privilege married couples?
The most likely response to the findings presented in this Article
is to continue the piecemeal approach by adding yet new categories
of individuals to the list of those who can seek protection orders or
criminal charges. This Article has shown that the following people
have been left underprotected under their state domestic violence
law: (1) women who have gone on a few dates with their abuser but
did not enter long-term relationships; (2) women who have main-
tained separate residences from their abusers; (3) women who have
been abused by men who are married to other women; (4) women
who sublet a room in a boarding house or an apartment with an
abuser; (5) pregnant women who do not live with the abusers who
are the fathers of the potential child; and (6) women and men in
various family situations that do not include marriage or blood ties,
such as a widow of the defendant's brother, stepmother, maternal
grandfather, former stepdaughter, former girlfriend, and various
college students.
in a homophobic society.").
188. In the national survey of violence against women, only 1% of surveyed women and
0.8% of surveyed men reported living with a same-sex intimate partner at least once in their
lifetimes. See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 181, at 29. The low reported rate of living in
an intimate relationship with a person of the same sex provides modest insight into the
broader problem of the underreporting of same-sex violence in the gay community. If people
will not even admit to having been in a same-sex intimate relationship for the purposes of an
anonymous survey, it seems hard to imagine that they would publicly acknowledge
themselves as being in an intimate relationship with a person of the same sex for the purpose
of taking advantage of the law of domestic violence.
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Closing these gaps on a piecemeal basis, however, is not much of
a solution because new gaps will simply appear in the future.
Further, that solution does not address the fundamental question
of why we have a law of domestic violence. This is an under-
theorized field without much discussion of why battery in a domestic
or intimate sphere should be treated differently than other kinds of
battery. In fact, it is not even clear whether we have a law of
intimate violence or a law of same-household violence. The theory
underlying the law of domestic violence may be that it is more
feasible to create an enhanced set of remedies when the identity of
the perpetrator is known. Further, it may be the case that the harm
is greater when one has actually known the perpetrator in advance
of the battery. If those suppositions are correct, then the law of
domestic violence should simply make available its protection orders
and system of warrantless arrests whenever the victim alleges that
she knows the identity of someone who she has reason to believe
may seek to batter her. Whether she knows the perpetrator because
she'89 dated him, lived with him, worked with him, met him through
a mutual friend, or shared a boarding house with him should not be
relevant to whether the law is willing to offer her some legal
recourse. The only real question should be the basis of her fear of
harm. On the other hand, if we believe the harm is greater when a
woman has been intimate with her abuser, then the law should
reflect that fact. It should not matter if they live together, were
intimate over a lengthy period of time, or shared financial resources.
Again, the marital model does a poor job of defining who needs legal
recourse.
The law of domestic violence has evolved from a system in which
men were privileged within marriage to beat their wives to a system
where men are penalized more stringently if they beat their wives
within marriage rather than if they beat a woman outside the
context of marriage. The law is not "neutral" with respect to
domestic violence; it now articulates the presumption that domestic
violence is worse than other kinds of violence. This evolution in the
law has not been accompanied by the development of a theory to
explain why we have an enhanced, rather than neutral, law of
189. My use of pronouns reflects the most common domestic violence scenario, but there
is no reason for laws to be written in gender-specific terms.
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domestic violence. Only when we answer the fundamental question
of why domestic violence is worse than comparable violence outside
the domestic sphere will we begin to answer the question of how the
law should define domestic violence. In the meantime, we have a
legal system that reflexively privileges marriage and those in
marriage-like relationships without asking who is truly deserving
of those privileges.
CONCLUSION
Research on domestic violence has presumed that the marriage-
mimicry model is the best way to understand the nature of this
problem. Hence, statistics on domestic violence presume the
existence of an intimate relationship without asking whether such
data collection underreports the nature of the problem.19° The only
lens available through which to see the underinclusiveness of the
marital model is the case law interpreting domestic violence
statutes. These statutes reflect that the marital model leaves
women (and some men) underprotected from domestic violence
because they cannot establish that they lived in the same household
or were sufficiently intimate with their alleged abusers. More
research is needed on domestic violence that can help clarify who
are the potential victims of such violence, as well as what aspects of
the law of domestic violence are the most effective.
The domestic violence and the same-sex marriage movement have
both fueled the marriage-mimicry model of law reform. Courts and
legislatures can continue to recognize the equal protection problems
inherent in our current system of law while not embracing the
marriage-mimicry model of law reform. Instead, we should seek to
disentangle privileges and benefits from marital status. Such a
regime would truly represent fairness to all and help alleviate a
patriarchal regime of compulsory heterosexuality.
This Article has focused on the law of domestic violence to show
the limitations of the marriage-mimicry model for defining who
should be protected. It has taken three decades for the law to begin
to cover individuals outside the traditional context of marriage, and
190. See, e.g., Marianne W. Zawitz, Domestic Violence: Violence Between Intimates, in 1
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FROM A PRIVATE MATTER TO A FEDERAL OFFENSE, supra note 45, at 1.
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many states still have huge holes in their statutory coverage. But,
at least the law of domestic violence has developed over the last
thirty years to broaden its umbrella of coverage. In that sense, it
has been the exception to the rule. Most areas of federal law still use
a pure marriage model-not even a marriage-mimicry model-to
define who receives privileges and benefits in the areas of taxation,
inheritance, and immigration.19 ' A strong movement exists in the
United States to make marriage available to same-sex partners.
Even if this movement is successful, however, many individuals will
still fall outside the walls of privileges and benefits because they do
not choose to enter the institution of marriage. 192 Only the disentan-
glement solution will benefit those individuals.
It is possible for society to embrace both the disentanglement
solution and the same-sex marriage solution. In fact, the disentan-
glement solution may make it easier to gain support for same-sex
marriage because marriage extension will be purely symbolic rather
than benefit-granting.
Some voices in Canada have embraced a disentanglement rather
than extension solution.'93 Professor Holland, who teaches at the
University of Western Ontario, has observed: "[ilt is impossible to
consider reform options without questioning why our whole focus is
on sexual-romantic relationships rather than on a wider range of
191. See supra note 5 (discussing GAO Report).
192. This same problem also exists under civil union statutes. For example, the
Connecticut civil union statute makes the benefits of civil union available only to same-sex
partners. See 2005 Conn. Legis. Serv. 05-10 (West) (approved Apr. 20, 2005). Opposite-sex
couples who want the benefits of marriage must enter the institution of marriage itself.
Vermont's civil union statute also limits that category to same-sex couples. See VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1202(2) (2002). The civil union approach has therefore served to reinforce the
marriage-mimicry model by insisting that individuals enter marriage or civil union to get
benefits and preferring marriage over civil union for opposite-sex couples.
193. See Winifred Holland, Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The
Assimilation of Marriage and Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114, 120-21 (2000) (arguing
that the model should be functional and based on cohabitation). Steven Homer has also
questioned the relationship between marriage and state-provided benefits:
Marriage has been described as having "positive values," and contributing to
"community stability." That the state has an interest in promoting marriage
because of the social good marriage does is a circular argument, since marriage
only performs those goods because the state assigns them to marriage or gives
it a monopoly on them.
Homer, supra note 1, at 529.
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relationships .... "194 Yet, the marriage extension strategy coupled
with marriage mimicry in the United States has caused us not to
ask those fundamental, functional questions. By focusing on the law
of domestic violence, this Article has sought to begin that conversa-
tion. We should have a sunset clause on the 1049 federal provisions
that tie benefits to marriage and use a functional approach to
determine the criteria for procuring those benefits. Such an
approach would better serve the interests of society and even appeal
to fiscal conservatives by helping us use our resources more wisely.
194. Holland, supra note 193, at 117-18.
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